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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the citation of international sources of law in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions has stirred up considerable controversy. This has
played out not only within the academy,' but also among the Justices. If there is
T Yale Law School, J.D. expected, 2018; Yale College, B.A., 2015. 1am extremely grateful to Pro-
fessor Linda Greenhouse for her thoughts and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Note. I would also like
to thank Elizabeth King, Mattie Wheeler, and the rest of the Yale Journal of International Law editorial
board and staff for their comments and assistance throughout the publication process. Lastly, I thank
Erin Alexander, who read this Note prior to final publication and to whom I owe more than I can put
into words. All errors, of course, remain my own.
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G. Silverman, Hayek and the Citation ofForeign
Law: A Response to Professor Jeremy Waldron, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2015) (making a Hayekian
argument in favor of the citation of foreign law, when informative); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and
the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132 (2005) (claiming that "the citation of foreign law
can rest on the idea of the law of nations"); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Prob-
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any merit to either the praise or the criticism of foreign law citations evinced
from the respective comments of Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia,
2
the debate has greatly and puzzlingly missed the target.
Little has been written about foreign governments actively trying to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process of U.S. courts. And yet, it is the practice
of foreign sovereigns playing the role of amici curiae that most frequently
brings foreign law to the Justices' attention.3 This practice has the potential to
be much more worrisome than a U.S. judge deciding, sua sponte, to research
and carefully consider international (or foreign) law. This Note contributes to
this underdeveloped discussion.
The scarce literature on the topic of amicus briefs filed by foreign sover-
eigns seems to imply that scholars are not worried about this practice. Or, as
this Note suggests, legal scholarship has largely overlooked foreign amici.
Twenty years ago, Stephen Plass wrote an article that did not aim to "provide
an exhaustive historical analysis of Supreme Court response to amici efforts,
but rather set[] out several historical spotlights which illuminate the futility of
foreign amici.' 4 Stephen McAllister's 2010 short contribution offered a brief
and incomplete history of sovereign amicus briefs filed by the federal and state
governments, as well as by Native American Tribes and foreign governments.
5
No systematic study of foreign amici, however, was available until Kris-
ten Eichensehr's recent article. Descriptively, Eichensehr found that between
1978 and 2013, forty-six foreign countries, the European Union, the European
Community, and the Council of Europe filed sixty-eight amicus briefs in thirty-
nine merits cases in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.7 Eichensehr identified
four kinds of foreign amicus briefs, relying on (1) international facts, (2) treaty
law, (3) customary international law, and (4) foreign law.8 Based on the forty-
six percent citation rate of foreign amici between 1978 and 2013, which favor-
lem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 150-51 (2005) (arguing that citing foreign law risks turning into "counting
noses").
2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to
the majority's citation of foreign law as "meaningless" and "[d]angerous dicta" because 'this Court ...
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans' (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)); STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND
THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 239 (2015) (arguing that considering
foreign law and practices "can nonetheless help [U.S.] judges produce better decisions without con-
straining their decisional autonomy"); Justice Stephen Breyer & Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at the
U.S. Association of Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Deci-
sions (Jan. 13, 2005), http://domino.american.edulAU/media/mediarel.nsf/l D265343BDC2189
785256B810071F238/1 F2F7DC4757FDO1 E85256F890068E6E0.
3. See infra Part II (discussing numerous instances in which foreign sovereign amicus briefs
cited foreign and international law); Cf Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (2004) (pointing out that "[ilt
remains to be seen whether the use of international materials spreads from amicus briefs to the parties'
briefs").
4. Stephen A. Plass, The Foreign Amici Dilemma, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1995).
5. Stephen R. McAllister, The Supreme Court's Treatment ofSovereigns as Amici Curiae, 13
GREEN BAG 2D 289 (2010).
6. Kristen Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289
(2016).
7. Id. at 292, 308 fig.2, 313.
8. Id. at 312-19.
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ably compares to that of the U.S. government as an amicus curiae, Eichensehr
convincingly disproved Plass's claims on the futility of foreign amici.9 Norma-
tively, Eichensehr argued that courts should afford the most weight to foreign
sovereign amici's views on foreign law, but grant almost no deference to for-
eign amici's arguments on U.S. law-treating arguments on international facts,
customary international law, and treaties similarly to claims by the U.S. gov-
ernment.10 This conclusion, Eichensehr holds, follows from the fact that ration-
ales comparable to those given in support of deference to the U.S. government
hold true for the views of foreign amici.
Eichensehr's excellent contribution, however, has its limits. Most nota-
bly, Eichensehr dispenses with the preceding two hundred years of Supreme
Court litigation in three paragraphs.12 The analysis of this Note counters certain
mistaken assumptions about foreign sovereign amici that one might draw based
on Eichensehr's exclusive focus on post-1978 foreign amicus briefs.13 A reader
might wonder if the foreign amici practice is a rather unusual, surprising, recent
development due to our increasingly globalized world. If that were the case, it
would be reasonable to sympathize with Justice Scalia's concerns.14 After all,
Eichensehr mentions "the Court's surprising practice of relying on the views of
foreign sovereigns in a variety of circumstances."15 Moreover, the fact that
Eichensehr's focus coincides with the Supreme Court's sharp turn to the right
over the last forty years-under Chief Justices Burger (1969-1986), Rehnquist
(1986-2005), and Roberts (2005-present)--further complicates the analysis.
Some might erroneously conclude that partisanship plays a role in foreign sov-
ereign participation as amici curiae.
This Note complements Eichensehr's contribution by addressing these
limitations. As this Note highlights, foreign sovereign amicus participation is
neither novel nor surprising, and any inference from Eichensehr's findings that
it could be a transitory "mood" due to the current preferences of particular Jus-
tices is mistaken. And, as Eichensehr acknowledges without explaining,' 6 there
is nothing partisan about the usefulness and validity of foreign sovereign partic-
ipation as amici curiae. Foreign amici are regular, though infrequent, repeat
players at the Court, and the Justices have relied on the benefits of this practice
for centuries. This Note represents the first systematic attempt at unveiling this
neglected history and showing the kinds of arguments that have proven effec-
tive in front of the Justices. This Note catalogues twenty-five amicus briefs
9. Id. at 321-22.
10. Id. at 296.
11. Id. at 325-55.
12. Id. at 297-98.
13. Id. at 302-03 n.64 (clarifying that "the analysis in the remainder of the Article is based on
the foreign sovereign amicus briefs on the merits from 1978 through 2013").
14. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court ...
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 325-26; see also id. at 351 ("Perhaps even more surprising
than the frequency of such arguments is the extent to which the Court cares about and relies on argu-
ments about the domestic law of foreign countries, typically without comment or explanation." (footnote
omitted)).
16. Id. at 319-20.
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filed in fifteen merits cases (and six briefs at the certiorari stage) by thirteen
foreign sovereigns up until 1978.'
Through that discussion, the Note intuitively simplifies Eichensehr's
quadripartite framework of analysis. Unlike Eichensehr, I am interested in pre-
dicting whether the Court will defer to foreign amici, not to what degree it will
do so. The Court's deferential approach to different kinds of sources undenia-
bly falls on a spectrum. 8 But the extremes chosen by Eichensehr lead three out
of her four categories to unhelpfully fall somewhere in the middle.19 Through
the lens of the study of pre-1978 foreign sovereign aricus briefs, this Note
proposes an alternative, simpler framework. Foreign amici, in addition to more
standard legal arguments applying U.S. domestic law, may predominantly offer
arguments based on either legal facts or foreign interests.
Fact-based arguments are arguments offering legal facts that, if accepted
by the Court, necessitate a specific conclusion (often procedural in nature).
This kind of brief is common in foreign immunity controversies; 20 for example,
upon the acceptance of the legal fact that a vessel is publicly owned, the only
legal argument remaining is conclusory: the vessel enjoys sovereign immunity.
Fact-based briefs force the Justices to make a binary choice. On the one hand,
the Justices might accept the foreign amici legal facts and their ensuing effects
on the ruling; on the other hand, the Court might refute the facts and risk a po-
tential foreign relations fallout.
Interest-based arguments, instead, rely on economic consequences, treaty
regulations, international customary law, foreign law, and so forth.
21 This type
17. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
18. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 355.
19. Id. at 325-55.
20. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Suggestion of British Embassy at 29-30, In re Muir, 254 U.S.
522 (1921) (No. 18) ("The vessel is avowed as a public ship during the period of her public service; that
official declaration is not to be made the subject of contentious testimony . . . , and that fact establishes
her immunity."); Brief for British Embassy at 10, Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619
(1921) (No. 555) ("The official avowal by the British Embassy, by its own Certificate, and the Sugges-
tion of its counsel, conclusively establishes the fact of the requisition of the Baron Ogilvy and its gov-
ernmental character and precludes further enquiry into the validity, legality or effect thereof."); Motion
of the Republic of Lebanon for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief in Support of the Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Nat'l Comm. of Gibran v. Shiya, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (No. 776)
("The Court of Appeals Decision Overlooks Respondent's Breach of Duty to Petitioner" by "imput[ing]
an intent on the part of the petitioner to, in effect, assign a 25% interest in the corpus of the Gibran Trust
to respondent.") (emphasis omitted).
21. See, e.g., Motion of Canada for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Cana-
da Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (No. 70) (ar-
guing that continued relations between the United States and the foreign sovereign, in addition to multi-
lateral treaties, necessitated a decision favorable to amici); Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus
Curiae and Brief of the Republic of Liberia as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Work-
ers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 33) ("The decision of the Court of Appeals ... would most seriously
threaten the following objectives of the Government of Liberia: 1. The according of full faith and credit
to registration of vessels under its flag. 2. The assurance of freedom of the international commerce
served by its vessels from unwarranted, unlawful and conflicting administrative regulations and con-
trols."); Brief of the Government of Denmark, Amicus Curiae at 1, Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (No. 322) (arguing that maritime nations' economic survival depended on the
Court's favorable decision); Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae at 2, Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958)
(No. 251) (arguing that "[t]he continued observance of these [treaty] obligations-and their common
interpretation-are vital to world trade and to the maintenance in international relations of the Rule of
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of brief simply calls the Court to engage in a balancing test, evaluating compet-
ing considerations. It brings to the table the effects and implications of a poten-
tial ruling on a friendly foreign nation in economic, political, or legal terms.
Though deference is proper for interest-based arguments, this Note argues that
the Court is rightly skeptical of fact-based amicus briefs.
Part I analyzes the practice of indirect amicus-like filing by foreign gov-
ernments through the Office of the Attorney General. Developed contempora-
neously to amicus curiae participation during oral argument in the 181 Os, indi-
rect participation maintained "horizontal networks"22 of communication
23between the Court and foreign executives. Predating the formal practice of
filing amicus briefs, the Spanish government's interposed claim in an 1818
prize case played a de facto amicus role.24 The Anne thus represents a first at-
tempt at direct amicus-like participation by a foreign government.
Part II relies on the proliferation of foreign sovereign amicus briefs in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to draw a distinction between interest-based
and fact-based arguments. Predictably, the Court has historically shown skepti-
cism towards fact-based briefs, if not previously vetted by the U.S. Executive,
while it has felt much more comfortable with interest-based arguments. The
British Embassy's experimentation with both fact-based and interest-based ar-
guments plays a central role in the discussion. Overall, the Court has generally
been friendly towards foreign amici, not only by citing and engaging with their
briefs, but also by granting them oral argument time.
Part III reflects on the historical and normative analyses of the preceding
Sections in light of today's political and judicial climate. Notwithstanding the
tensions with American isolationism and the incentives to reduce the debate
over foreign amici and foreign law in U.S. courts to divergences in judicial phi-
losophy, the history of the foreign amici practice counsels otherwise.
This Note concludes that interest-based foreign sovereign amicus briefs-
and the resulting occasional citation of foreign and international law-should
be perceived as valuable contributions to litigation in U.S. courts, and not as a
threat to the integrity of our judicial system.
I. PRECEDENTS FOR FOREIGN SOVEREIGN PARTICIPATION: 1800s
As amici curiae began to participate in front of the Court in the first dec-
ades of the 19th century, so did foreign sovereigns. However, as Section L.A
discusses, foreign sovereigns initially started to interact as claimants in prize
proceedings; foreign emissaries would indirectly interpose a claim on the own-
Law"); Brief of the Royal Danish Government as Amicus Curiae at 5, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953) (No. 226) ("[A]ffirmance of the judgment below will necessarily result in the abrogation of a rule
of comity which has been adhered to for decades by all of the maritime nations of the world.").
22. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 19 (2004).
23. Indirect participation was in use until 1978 when, as Eichensehr discusses in depth, the
Court rejected it as inherently problematic. See Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 299 (explaining the bizarre
instance in which "Japan's diplomatic note supported the interests of Zenith Radio (the petitioner), but it
was transmitted to the Court by the United States (the respondent)") (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978)); see infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
24. See The Anne, 16 U.S. 435 (1818).
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ership of a seized vessel, relying on the U.S. Attorney General as a proxy. The
case of The Anne, analyzed in Section I.B, represents the first attempt at direct
participation on the part of a foreign government as a third-party intervener. In
those early years, foreign sovereign amici limited themselves to offering fact-
based arguments that made the Justices especially uncomfortable with direct
participation. Against this historical backdrop, Part II will focus on the evolu-
tion of direct participation over the twentieth century and the introduction of
interest-based arguments in foreign amicus briefs.
A. Indirect Participation as Claimants
Traditionally, foreign sovereigns did not directly engage with the U.S.
Supreme Court. For a large part of history, "[t]he structural core of a disaggre-
gated world order [has been] a set of horizontal networks among national gov-
ernment officials in their respective areas."25 For that reason, foreign govern-
ments tended not to speak directly to the Court in "diagonal" or "vertical"
fashions, but merely relied on "horizontal" channels. While horizontal commu-
nications occur among foreign counterparts of the same branch of government
(executive-executive or judiciary-judiciary), diagonal interactions are non-
hierarchical, intra-branch relations (executive-judiciary).26 Vertical networks,
instead, are created in the rare instances in which a foreign sovereign expressly
or impliedly agrees to the jurisdiction of the U.S. judiciary and places itself in a
subordinate position vis-a-vis the U.S. courts. The fact that governmental net-
works have historically been horizontal, however, does not mean that occasions
for non-horizontal interactions never occurred until modern times.
The potential for non-horizontal interaction between the Supreme Court
and foreign sovereigns was first occasioned in prize cases.27 As Samuel Krislov
argued, participation by third parties (including foreign governments) during in
rem proceedings stems from the very nature of these actions. "[B]ecause they
established rights of ownership against the world, [in rem proceedings] re-
quired full participation by all who might be adversely affected"-namely, the
world.28 Indeed, in the late 1700s and early 1800s, it was customary for foreign
governments to interpose claims during prize proceedings, claiming possession
over the seized vessel in a U.S. court.29
Interactions between the Supreme Court and foreign governments, how-
ever, were initially filtered through the respective executive branches. The offi-
25. SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 19.
26. See Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 365 (concluding that her article "reveals that transnational
governmental networks are not just horizontal (executive-executive or judicial-judicial), but also diago-
nal (executive-judicial)").
27. Prize cases are in rem actions brought by the government against a maritime property that
allegedly belongs to a wartime enemy nation or its nationals.
28. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 698 (1963).
29. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) (describing the seizure of
the Charming Betsy by an American vessel and the Consul of Denmark interposition to claim its posses-
sion); McDonough v. Dannery (The Mary Ford), 3 U.S. 188 (1796) (describing the seizure of the aban-
doned Mary Ford by an American vessel and the interpositions to claim its possession by the Consul of
his Britannic Majesty and the Consul of the French Republic).
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cial, though uncodified, procedure was somewhat cumbersome for all parties
involved. The foreign government that wished to make a claim in front of the
Court had to rely on diplomatic channels. The foreign government would make
its claims known to the U.S. Attorney General by sending its local emissaries
(ministers, ambassadors, or consuls) to the Department of State. The Attorney
General would then file a "suggestion" in the Court, setting forth the foreign
government's allegations. The Attorney General served as a de facto proxy for
foreign sovereign amici.30 Some litigants attempted to object to this practice in
front of the Supreme Court, as "an interference and encroachment of the execu-
tive on the pro-vice of the Court, not sanctioned by any precedent."3' But the
Court held in 1841 that the U.S. Executive's interest in enforcing treaties with
foreign governments mandated the Attorney General's intervention.32 Though
the Court upheld this practice until the 1978 shift briefly described in Section
III.B and more thoroughly analyzed in Eichensehr's piece,33 Part II shows how
it soon became obsolete.
Direct participation would have required the Justices to interact with for-
eign sovereigns that were not subject to their jurisdiction. In that process, the
Court would be compelled to make delicate decisions-such as whether to trust
foreign amici's claims-that could have serious foreign relations consequences.
Indirect participation thus provided at least two advantages.
First, indirect participation preserved the classic horizontal structure of
foreign relations postulated by Anne-Marie Slaughter.34 Under this model, the
foreign executive would interact with the U.S. executive branch. This process
nicely squares with the Court's decision, some one hundred years after the bulk
of prize adjudications, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. With
Curtiss- Wright, the Court recognized "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations."3 6 This plenary and exclusive power of the Execu-
tive, though not limiting the Court's jurisdiction in deciding cases involving in-
ternational matters, certainly makes the Justices wary of directly interacting
with foreign governments outside of the U.S. jurisdiction.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon exemplifies this benefit offered by
indirect participation.37 The U.S. District Attorney offered to the Court a "sug-
gestion" on behalf of Napoleon Bonaparte. Under the facts of the case, Chief
Justice Marshall could not have possibly escaped the foreign relations issues
30. Kristov, supra note 28, at 198-99.
31. United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 571 (1841).
32. Id.
33. See Eichensehr, supra note 6 at 299-300.
34. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
36. Id. at 320.
37. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 118 (1812) (reporting the Attorney
General's suggestion that "in as much as there exists between the United States of America and Napole-
on ... a state of peace and amity; the public vessels of his said Imperial and Royal Majesty ... may
freely enter the ports and harbors of the said United States, and at pleasure depart therefrom without
seizure, arrest, detention or molestation").
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altogether. In this dispute over the identity of the rightful owner of the vessel,
the Court had two options: it could have either sided with the U.S. citizen and
risked a foreign relations crisis, or it could have returned the attached vessel to
the foreign sovereign. The U.S. Attorney General also intervened during oral
argument; he claimed that "[t]he right to demand redress [for any actual unlaw-
ful action] belongs to the executive department, which alone represents the
sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations."
39 The Chief Jus-
tice decided not to interfere with the executive branch's assessment. He held
that the vessel, belonging to a foreign sovereign, was outside of U.S. jurisdic-
tion.40 This holding did not require the Court to stand up against Napoleon. In-
stead, the Justices could simply listen to the U.S. Attorney General and the Dis-
trict Attorney.41
Second, indirect participation ensured that the Attorney General filtered
and vetted foreign sovereigns' allegations before they reached the Court, main-
taining in turn the benefits of foreign amicus participation. On the one hand,
opening up the Court's doors to any foreign government could dangerously
transform the Court into a battlefield for warring sovereigns. Denying access to
all foreign sovereigns, on the other hand, would annul the foreign relations
benefits that come with allowing foreign amici participation. The Attorney
General vetting process struck a balance by limiting the privilege of voicing
views and interests as amicus curiae to foreign sovereign with friendly relation-
ships with the United States. In fact, governments with hostile relationships
with the United States would be less likely to have the necessary diplomatic
leverage to effectively make representations to the U.S. executive branch. This
approach nicely squares with the doctrine, explicitly recognized only later on
by the Court, that "any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign
power . . .. embrac[es] the privilege of resorting to United States courts."
42
And, moreover, some degree of bargaining over the nature of the representa-
tions would reasonably occur before a claim was brought to the Justices' atten-
tion.
Through indirect participation, the Court was strengthening its ability to
remain within its constitutional boundaries. At the same time, the Court would
not be called to second-guess the fact-based information offered by foreign
sovereigns. This indirect practice allowed the Court to presume foreign claims
to be true-because the Attorney General, a trusted source, provided them. By
deferring to the Attorney General's Office, as the Court customarily does, par-
ticularly in the realm of foreign affairs,43 the Justices could focus their rulings
38. Id. at 117-20.
39. Id. at 132.
40. Id. at 147.
41. Id.; see also The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 524 (1841) (reporting a suggestion filed on behalf
of the Spanish ambassador).
42. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1964).
43. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1987) (arguing that the Solicitor General plays the role of a "tenth justice" on the Supreme Court); Cur-
tis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659-63 (2000) (discussing
the long history of deference by the Court to the executive when it comes to foreign affairs).
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on the law instead. In other words, the Court was outsourcing part of the labor
(and ensuing headaches) to the Attorney General.
The focus of this Note, however, is not on foreign sovereigns' (vertical)
participation as claimants.44 Instead, it discusses instances in which a foreign
sovereign (diagonally) participates as a neutral third party to the dispute-as an
external agent, in no way under the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, when a
foreign government wishes to intervene as a third party to a dispute, its objec-
tive is rather clear: self-interest. Unlike when it plays the role of a litigant, a
foreign amicus reasonably has broader interests in addition to a perhaps minor
interest in the specific case at stake. The foreign government as amicus may be
interested in the protection of its citizens, its sovereign rights, or its fundamen-
tal values-but it does not have to explicitly articulate any of these interests for
the Court. In these cases, the risk for deception and hidden motives is, in theo-
ry, much greater. These are thus the instances that could give rise to an interest-
ing debate surrounding the Court's citation of foreign sources of law: Is the
Court, by reading foreign amicus briefs and citing foreign "moods, fads, or
fashions,"45 simply giving strength to foreign governments' interests expressed
in amicus briefs, at the expenses of domestic ones? Part IV develops a fuller
explanation, declining the appeal of those criticisms.
B. First Attempts at Direct Participation as Interveners
The first instance in which a foreign sovereign attempted to directly ap-
pear in front of the Supreme Court as a third-party, neutral to the lawsuit, actu-
ally predates the formal practice of amicus briefs. The first amicus curiae brief
was formally filed in front of the Court in 1821.46 However, third parties had
found other devices to have their interests heard even earlier-by way of sug-
gestions, general courtesy, or formal application by the executive branch.47 In
deed, between 1813 and 1814, U.S. Attorney General William Pinkney ap-
peared at least twice during oral argument as amicus curiae.48 Spain, as a
neutral third-party, attempted to make representations in front of the Court as
early as 1818: it interposed a claim in the in rem prize proceeding The Anne.49
For the reasons discussed in the preceding pages, notwithstanding its novelty,
44. In such instances, the foreign sovereign, by accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, de facto
positions itself lower in the hierarchy vis-A-vis the Court itself, thus creating a vertical network. In those
cases, the interests of foreign governments, readily ascertainable by the Court, lie in the dispute to be
adjudicated.
45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 17 (1823) (granting Henry Clay's motion, as amicus curiae on
behalf of the state of Kentucky, requesting a rehearing due to lack of representation of Kentucky's inter-
ests).
47. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 700-01 (1963) (discussing how, even before the inception of the amicus curiae practice, third par-
ties were allowed to voice their views by way of suggestions, general courtesy, or formal application by
the executive branch).
48. See Beatty's Adm'rs v. Bumes' Adm'rs, 12 U.S. 98, 106 (1814) (reporting the arguments
made by "PINKNEY, as amicus curiae"); Livingston v. Dorgenois, II U.S. 577, 582 (1813) (stating that
"PINKNEY, Attorney General,... appeared as amicus curiae").
49. The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 435 (1818).
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Spain's participation is not particularly surprising. It was the structure of in rem
prize cases that necessarily drew the attention of foreign sovereigns.
The Anne represents an interestingly rare twist on foreign government
participation in prize cases. The Spanish consul intervened in the prize proceed-
ings ensuing the capture of the Anne, a British ship.50 The Spanish consul re-
quested the restitution of the Anne to the British owner on the grounds that the
capture occurred on Spanish territory. 5' That is, the alleged violation of
Spain's sovereignty was claimed to render the capture of the Anne unlawful
under international law.
Though it is easy to imagine the rarity of the fact pattern presented in The
Anne, serendipitously one of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices had recently writ-
ten on the topic. In an 1816 note entitled On the Practice in Prize Causes, Jus-
tice Story argued that, "in a case where the capture has been made in violation
of the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral country, the claim for restitution must
be made, not by the enemy proprietor, but the neutral government."52 Little did
Justice Story know that, two years later, he would be confronted with that same
issue in The Anne.
Justice Story wrote the Court's unanimous opinion affirming the validity
of the capture. The Court ruled on technical grounds,53 but, interestingly, it did
not completely shut its doors to foreign sovereigns. According to the Court,
foreign consuls represent the commercial and property interests of their gov-
ernments and their subjects. Unless otherwise expressly charged, consuls may
not act as ambassadors or diplomatic ministers, enforcing their government's
sovereignty rights.54 Justice Story, writing at a time predating the practice of
amicus briefs, explicitly reserved his opinion on the question of whether an
ambassador may make representations in front of the Court in the absence of
assent or sanction by the U.S. executive branch. However, as he wrote in On
the Practice in Prize Causes, Justice Story was confident that some procedure
for foreign sovereigns' participation ought to exist.55 His reservation, then, was
50. Spain was the neutral government making a claim of violation of its territorial jurisdiction.
During the War of 1812, the U.S. privateer Ultor seized the Anne, a British ship, in proximity of (or
within) the Spanish territory of Santo Domingo. The exact location of the Anne at the time of capture
was in dispute. See id.
51. See id. at 442 (reporting opposing counsel's statement that "[the neutral government has
no right to interpose . .. by compelling restitution to British subjects .... The neutral government may,
perhaps, require some atonement for the violation of its territory, but it has no right to require that this
atonement shall include any sacrifice to the British claimant").
52. Joseph Story, On the Practice in Prize Causes, in NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS BY THE LATE JUDGE STORY 13, 21 (Frederic Thomas Pratt ed., 1854).
53. 1 characterize this as a technical argument because the Court failed to address the fact that,
in light of Spain's own domestic conflict, "no minister from that country was received by the U.S. gov-
ernment, but the former consuls were continued in the exercise of their functions by its permission." 16
U.S. 435, 437-38 (1818). Eventually, in 1815 and thus after this dispute had commenced, the United
States recognized Luis de Onis-who had settled in the Philadelphia, informally, since 1809-as Am-
bassador of Spain. See JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE
DESTINY OF AMERICA 516 (2009).
54. The Anne was thereupon cited in support of the proposition that consuls, unless expressly
invested with diplomatic powers, are not entrusted with the authority to represent their sovereigns
abroad. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 678-79 (1898) (citing The Anne, 16
U.S. 435, 445-46 (1818)).
55. See Story, supra note 52, at 21.
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just a symptom of the novelty of this practice and the fact-based nature of the
arguments offered by Spain. It resulted in the proliferation of the practice of in-
direct filing, discussed in Section L.A above.
This first attempt by a foreign sovereign to participate in the U.S. judicial
process as a neutral party, playing the de facto role of a modem amicus curiae,
should be briefly analyzed in the context of international relations and the per-
ceived institutional role of the Court. The Justices had mixed pressures as to
whether they should take into account the Spanish consul's representations. On
the one hand, as the counsel for respondent pointed out in The Anne, the Span-
ish territory of Santo Domingo was "permitted to be made the theatre of British
hostility, and in various instances was violated with impunity" during the War
of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain.56 On the other hand, the
Court decided The Anne at a time in which the United States and Spain were
trying to settle some of their hostilities over the colonies. These negotiations
resulted, a few months later, in the Adams-Onis Treaty, which ceded Florida to
the United States and redefined the Spanish colonies' borders. The Court was
thus caught in the middle of a foreign relations debate.
The Court's holding understandably signals its discomfort with the Span-
ish consul's intervention and, more generally, with fact-based representations
by foreign sovereigns. The Spanish consul was offering a fact-based argument:
the Anne was, allegedly, on Spanish territory at the time of capture.58 Spain
was indirectly asking the Justices to evaluate its credibility as a fact-finder. But
the procedure of prize cases did not allow for the preliminary vetting of the At-
tomey General, like it had been the case in The Exchange, for example. 5 Not
presenting itself as an amicus curiae, and not requesting the approval of either
party, the Spanish consul could participate only with the Court's acquiescence.
The Court had three options: (1) trust the Spanish consul, and accept the
inevitable legal conclusion; (2) choose not to trust the consul's word, risking to
chill the negotiations over the Treaty; or (3) find a way to dismiss the consul's
claim. The Court logically chose the third, least controversial, alternative. Jus-
tice Story, for a unanimous Court, reasoned the Spanish consul's claim was
"asserted by an incompetent person and on that ground it ought to be dis-
missed."60 It was a compromise position, aimed at maintaining the Court's neu-
tral institutional role on foreign affairs matters. The Court allowed for foreign
sovereign participation through ambassadors, though it kicked the ball back in-
to the executive branch's field when it came to the indirect or direct nature of
such interventions.61
56. The Anne, 16 U.S. at 440.
57. See generally PHILIP COOLIDGE BROOKS, DIPLOMACY AND THE BORDERLANDS: THE
ADAMS-ONIs TREATY OF 1819 (1939) (discussing the history of the Adams-Onis Treaty).
58. The Anne, 16 U.S. at 436.
59. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 11 (1812)); infra note 72.
60. The Anne, 16 U.S. at 445-46.
61. See id. The Court was not called to consider its reservations on whether ambassadors
might intervene in the absence of the U.S. executive branch's approval until 1919. Until then, foreign
consuls and ministers simply made their representations in the Court through the U.S. Attorney General.
See supra notes 37, 41, and accompanying text.
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Perhaps indirect participation was not the only option available. Fifty
years after The Anne, in 1870, the Court held in The Sapphire that an agent and
representative of a foreign sovereign, advancing a civil claim against a U.S.
person, might file in U.S. courts.62 If foreign representatives (invested with dip-
lomatic powers) are allowed to appear in front of the Court as litigating parties,
representing their sovereigns, then it should follow that no particular limitations
ought to be placed on foreign representatives' ability to make representations to
the Court on behalf of foreign sovereigns. The role of foreign representatives in
both instances is the same: making official representations on behalf of foreign
sovereigns. Or so it would seem.
The Anne might be interpreted as a link between the old common law
practice of amicus curiae as disinterested "friends of the court" and the modem
advocacy role of amici on behalf of a party.63 It represents a first attempt at di-
rect participation by a foreign sovereign, as a neutral party to the dispute, with-
out any oversight on the part of the U.S. Attorney General. Though Spain had
no tangible claim to the attached property, its interests in upholding its territori-
al sovereignty pointed in the same direction as the claims of one of the litigat-
ing parties, the United Kingdom. The relations between the United States and
Spain exacerbated the Court's concerns over the fact-based nature of the Span-
ish claims, thus leading Justice Story to a compromise holding.
II. DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS: 1900S
The Anne, as reinforced by The Sapphire, left the door open for foreign
sovereign participation. Foreign representatives with diplomatic powers should
be able to directly appear in front of the Court and make representations on be-
half of their governments. Sections II.A and II.B below discuss both successful
and unsuccessful attempts of ambassadors to take advantage of that gap. These
first briefs continued the tradition of foreign sovereign interest in admiralty
cases.
As it will become apparent throughout Section II.A.1, foreign amici's ar-
guments may fall under two categories. Each category is useful in accounting
for the Court's reaction to different kinds of briefs: interest-based or fact-based
arguments. First, foreign amici might offer arguments based on international
(or simply foreign) interests. This was the case in The Strathearn saga6 and,
later on, in The Archimedes,65 as discussed in Section II.A.2. There, I analyze
the beginning of the formal practice of direct filing of foreign amicus briefs.
Second, foreign amici-as in the case of The Anne above-might offer fact-
based arguments to the Court. That is, by bringing to the Court's attention a
62. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 167-68 (1870) (allowing the French Emperor Napoleon 1II, as
"the agent and representative of the national sovereignty," to file a suit in U.S. courts in the name of
comity and friendly feeling").
63. Cf Krislov, supra note 28, at 698-704 (arguing that the Government's intervention by way
of a suggestion in admiralty and other suits may represent one of the early instances of the shift from
neutrality to advocacy).
64. See Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920); Dillon v. Strathearn Steam-
ship Co., 248 U.S. 182 (1918).
65. See Jackson v. The Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928).
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certain set of legal facts, foreign amici hope to shape the Court's rulings by ne-
cessitating a given conclusion based on those legal facts. This kind of argu-
ment, further discussed in Section II.A.3 with the examples of In re Muir and
The Pesaro, represents the line that the Court correctly drew for foreign sover-
eign participation.
The Court preferred not to allow direct participation of foreign amici of-
fering fact-based arguments, unless formally vetted and filtered by the Attorney
General or other members of the U.S. executive branch. While the Justices can
comfortably balance different sets of interests in their legal reasoning, they are
not usually in the business of evaluating the credibility of conclusory factual
allegations-let alone those of foreign amici, risking foreign relations fallouts.
By allowing interest-based arguments, the Court struck the correct balance in
recognizing that foreign amici can and should play an important role by bring-
ing to the fore the foreign affairs implications of litigation. The Court thus indi-
rectly answered the question that Justice Story left open in The Anne.
Before further delving into the history of pre-1978 foreign sovereign ami-
cus participation, a brief note on methodology is in order. Appendix A, which
is discussed in detail in Section II.B, includes a comprehensive list of all for-
eign sovereign amicus filings on the merits filed before 1978. That table lists
the relevant cases, the foreign governments that filed an amicus brief, and the
outcome of each case (in favor or against the foreign amicus). Because not all
amicus briefs from the first half of the twentieth century have been digitalized,
printed collections were also consulted.66 Exhaustive in aspiration, Appendix A
may suffer from the inevitable shortcoming of historical, archival research.
Nonetheless, the following analysis of these examples of foreign sovereign
amicus briefs draws attention to otherwise overlooked aspects of Supreme
Court history. This history informs today's important role of foreign amici and
the propriety of the Court's reliance on foreign and international law-the fo-
cus of Part III.
A. Rejection ofFact-Based Participation: OfAmbassadors and Private
Counsels
The first foreign actors to directly engage with the Supreme Court were
foreign ambassadors and embassies. The first foreign sovereign amicus briefs
were written by one of the most prominent repeat players and members of the
U.S. Supreme Court bar of his time: Frederic Ren6 Coudert Jr.67 Between 1913
66. Appendix A was compiled through a series of Boolean searches of online databases in-
cluding HeinOnline, LexisNexis, The Making of Modem Law, and Westlaw. Search strings were de-
signed to include key terms (such as "amic!") and roots of various countries (for example, "Germ!").
The online research was supplemented by a consultation of the Yale Law School Library's printed col-
lection of Supreme Court briefs filed between 1925 and 1980.
67. Coudert was the son of the co-founder of the international law firm Coudert Brothers, the
preeminent law firm for foreign governments at the time. Throughout his private practice with Coudert
Brothers, Frederic Coudert Jr. represented the governments of France, Greece, Italy, Belgium, and Rus-
sia. See Staff, Death ofF. R. Coudert, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1903, at 1. At 30 years old, Coudert argued
the landmark Insular Cases. See Staff, F. R. Coudert Dies; Noted Lawyer, 84, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1955,
at 17; see also Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Goetze
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and 1914, Coudert worked as a Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General
before becoming Legal Adviser to the British Embassy. As World War I pro-
gressed, preserving good relations with the Allied Powers-and, in particular,
the United Kingdom-became paramount for the United States. With the per-
mission of the Secretary of State and the Counselor of the Department of State,
Coudert sought "to be a buffer between the State Department and the Allied
Governments and to absorb as much of the shock as possible."69 To this end, in
the name of continued friendly relations, Coudert filed amicus briefs on behalf
of the British Embassy in five cases before the Supreme Court between 1918
and 1927.70
The direct filing of amicus briefs in front of the Supreme Court on behalf
of a foreign government can thus be seen as a tool to maintain relations of com-
ity with foreign sovereigns. Access to U.S. courts, and in particular to the Su-
preme Court, increases foreign sovereigns' perceptions of fairness and trust in
U.S. institutions. At least in the case of the British Embassy, the Department of
State seems to have approved the use of this practice. But this practice is also
instrumentally useful for litigation. In keeping with the spirit of the institution
of amici curiae, foreign governments can provide helpful information to the
Court.
However, direct participation requires diagonal networks of communica-
tion between different branches of different governments. It moves away from
the horizontal or vertical models, creating potential imbalances of power. ' In
fact, the Court is required to engage directly with the interests of a foreign ex-
ecutive, with no screening or filtering by the Attorney General. Indirect, hori-
zontal participation offered that kind of protection. The risks of diagonal inter-
actions between the Court and foreign governments have different salience
based on the kind of arguments offered by foreign amici. As the upcoming two
sections discuss, the Court's approach to foreign amici can be predicted based
on the kinds of arguments offered in foreign amicus briefs.
1. An American Lawyer, a British Carpenter, and the Beginning of
a Practice
All of Coudert's briefs dealt with instances in which the interests of the
British government, as a matter of international relations, were at stake. Two
Supreme Court cases in which Coudert represented the interests of the British
Embassy involved John Dillon-a British carpenter-against the British steam-
v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392
(1901).
68. F. R. Coudert Dies; Noted Lawyer, 84, supra note 67, at 17.
69. FREDERIC RENE COUDERT JR., A HALF CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 254 (Al-
lan Nevins ed., 1954).
70. See Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928); In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921);
Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S.
348 (1920); Dillon v. Strathearn Steamship Co., 248 U.S. 182 (1918).
71. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
channels).
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ship Stratheam.72 The British Embassy filed amicus briefs at all stages of the
litigation in favor of the Strathearn.73 Though ruling against the Strathearn, the
Court extensively engaged with a number of the arguments brought forward by
the British Embassy-implicitly recognizing the weight that Coudert's views,
and thus the Embassy's, carried with the Justices.
The extent to which the Court engaged with Coudert's arguments is
noteworthy, even though the British Embassy's interests were not ultimately
upheld. Coudert was asking the Court to "protect the merchant vessels of a
friendly foreign government" against deserting seamen.74 The British Embassy
argued that an interpretation of the Act as to nullify valid contracts under for-
eign law would be in violation of the international law principles against extra-
territoriality.75 Because, "[i]n the 'Seamen's Act,' Congress does not undertake
to require compliance . . . in the case of foreign seamen on foreign vessels, . . .
it is not necessary to consider what would be the effect of so extraordinary a
departure from the usual course of international comity." 76 Though the Court
dismissed Coudert's arguments,77 its willingness to engage with them shows
the Court's recognition of the important role that foreign amici play in litiga-
tions with foreign relations implications.
A simplistic distinction between fact-based and interest-oriented argu-
ments is helpful in examining the institutional approach to foreign amici. This
framework does not deny, of course, that amicus briefs often contain a diverse
set of arguments, ultimately attempting to draw (implicit or explicit) logical
conclusions on how U.S. domestic law should be applied or interpreted. After
all, to borrow Chief Justice Marshall's oft-cited phrase, it is the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the U.S. legal system we are expounding.78 However, the distinction
between fact-based and interest-oriented focuses on the kind of argumentative
leverage used by foreign sovereign amici to reach those conclusions.79
72. Mr. Dillon sued the Strathearn over the wages owed to him pursuant to the Seamen's Act
of 1915. The Court of Appeals certified two questions to the Supreme Court in The Strathearn L The
Court dismissed the questions and the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, ruling in favor of Mr. Dil-
lon. See The Stratheam, 256 F. 631 (1919). The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in The
Strathearn II. See Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920). The Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit. Id. at 357.
73. Coudert in his brief made the convincing argument that, if the contract made between Mr.
Dillon and the steamship under British law did not prevent the application of laws of the port, then "the
contract of a seaman ... would be governed by a different law at every foreign port where the vessel
might touch, and would become so kaleidoscopic and chameleon-like as to leave the legal relations of
the parties in hopeless confusion." Brief for British Embassy at 9, Stratheam Steamship Co. v. Dillon,
252 U.S. 348 (1920).
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 14-15.
76. Id. at 17.
77. The Embassy also appealed to an earlier Second Circuit decision, in The Italier, which
created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit's decision in The Strathearn L See id. at 12. Cf The Italier,
257 Fed. 712 (1919) (holding, in a similar situation as The Strathearn, that the seaman's request for
wages was premature).
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding.").
79. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (offering a series of examples of fact-based
and interest-based arguments).
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The problems of diagonal interaction are attenuated when a foreign sov-
ereign is merely making arguments on foreign governments' interests; they are
exacerbated when it comes to foreign legal facts. The Justices are able to eval-
uate foreign interests in their deliberation process as they see fit, balancing the
competing interests against one another as in the case of The Strathearn saga. If
domestic interests outweigh foreign ones, the Court has the option of explicitly
saying so. Foreign amici may be disappointed as a result, because their interests
have been given relatively little (though some) importance. However, as dis-
cussed in Section 2 below, when the foreign amicus offers fact-based argu-
ments leading to legal conclusions, the Court is pushed into a corner. The Court
can either accept or refute a legal fact. Blind acceptance with no vetting by the
U.S. executive branch risks error, but refusal can amount to a potential foreign
relations crisis. There is only one way of rejecting a fact-based argument that-
in light of the factual premises-necessitates only one possible legal conclu-
sion. In order to refute such an argument, the Court has to question the very re-
liability or truthfulness of the legal fact offered by a foreign government. Doing
so would reasonably have more problematic consequences, for it would entail
not only giving no importance to the foreign amicus's argument, but also call-
ing into question the sovereign's integrity.
2. In re Muir and The Pesaro: The Opposition to Foreign Amici's
Fact-Based Allegations
Despite Coudert's regular appearances, the Court did not wait long to put
a break on his novel approach to amicus filing when it went too far. The Justic-
es were open to interest-based arguments, but amicus briefs offering uncorrob-
orated facts that necessitated specific legal conclusions were reasonably unwel-
comed. The Court granted the British Embassy's request to file as amicus
curiae and participate in the oral argument for In re Muir in December 1918,
before the certiorari petition for The Strathearn I was granted. However, In
re Muir was decided one year after The Strathearn I. 81 Importantly, unlike in
The Strathearn II, the question in In re Muir was one of immunity, and the an-
swer thus largely revolved around legal facts. As outlined below, Coudert of-
fered a fact-based argument, asking the Court for complete deference to the
facts alleged by a foreign executive-something the Justices were not ready to
do.
The problematic nature of fact-based amicus briefs is exemplified by this
case. Coudert intervened, at all stages of this complex lawsuit, as amicus curiae
on behalf of the British Embassy.82 The Italian vessel objected that the repre-
sentations made by Coudert on behalf of the British Embassy should have come
80. Compare Monday, December 16, 1918, 1918 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 82 (granting Coudert's leave
to take part in the oral argument as amicus curiae in In re Muir), with Monday, June 9, 1919, 1918 J.
SUP. CT. U.S. 275 (granting the petition for a writ of certiorari in Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon).
81. Compare In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921), with Stratheam Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252
U.S. 348 (1920).
82. The facts of the case were complex. An Italian steamship, the Giuseppe Verdi, filed a suit
in a U.S. District Court against a British vessel, the Gleneden, to recover damages for a collision. An
arrest warrant was placed on the British vessel. See In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
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through official channels-namely, from the Department of State, speaking
through the U.S. Attorney General, on behalf of the British Embassy. The Ital-
ians were simply asking for indirect participation.83
The main purpose of the British Embassy's intervention at the Supreme
Court was to offer legal facts. Coudert argued that the Gleneden, though pri-
vately owned, was immune from judicial process in the United States because
it was a vessel in the public service of the British Government.84 An entire sec-
tion of Coudert's brief focused on arguing that a suggestion of immunity by
counsel for the British Embassy is a proper method of procedure and is conclu-
sive as to the official facts stated. As his amicus brief recognized, "[i]t has not
been the practice for the Embassy to come into Court as a party, or intervene in
litigation except for the purpose of informing the Court of official facts .. . up-
on which it may then act in conformity with the principles of international
law."85 Coudert claimed that the British Government was going through the
trouble to argue in court because doing otherwise would be "incompatible with
the courtesy which the British Government wishes to show to the Courts of the
United States."86
The Court could not directly question the legal facts themselves without
also questioning the good faith of the British Government. Instead, the Court
contested their source. Was Coudert, as private counsel for the Embassy, al-
lowed to offer proof that the vessel was publicly owned and make an argument
for immunity as a matter of procedure? Coudert argued that he was.87 But the
Court not only denied the petition for a writ of mandamus; it also implicitly
overruled the District Court's holding that private counsel may, as amicus curi-
ae, make representations on behalf of a foreign sovereign.
Justice Van Devanter, in one of his few opinions on the Court, correctly
limited the ability of foreign sovereigns to participate as amici. The Court rea-
soned that a foreign government has three options to make claims to immunity
in U.S. courts. First, "[a]s of right the British Government was entitled to ap-
pear in the suit."88 Second, "with its sanction, [the British Government's] ac-
credited and recognized representative might have appeared and have taken the
83. The British Embassy, in fact, had refused to produce proof of the public status of the ves-
sel, insisting that the District Court was "bound on the mere assertion of the claim of immunity to quash
the process and release the vessel." In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 528 (1921). Arguably no proof existed,
hence the Italian ship's request for the U.S. executive branch to step in.
84. Brief in Support of Suggestion of British Embassy at 2, In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (No.
2118).
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Coudert's distinct arguments in favor of his intervention, as private counsel, on behalf of a
foreign sovereign are rather interesting. See id. at 27 (listing a number of cases in which Coudert had
been allowed to file as amicus curiae on behalf of the British and Greek embassies). In particular,
Coudert's brief points out that a foreign ambassador, in the name of her government, is entitled to bring
a suit in U.S. courts under The Sapphire and "neither [her] authority nor the authority of [her] coun-
sel ... is to be questioned." Id. at 28-29. Therefore, Coudert argues, a foreign embassy most certainly
may appear, as amicus curiae, to make official representations, "avowing them as the acts of [its] Gov-
ernment." Id.
88. 254 U.S. at 532.
425
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
same steps in its interest."89 Third, if both of the previous options had been re-
jected, the foreign sovereign might have made diplomatic representations
which, "if that claim was recognized by the Executive Department of this gov-
ernment, . . . might be set forth and supported in an appropriate suggestion to
the court by the Attorney General."90 That is, a foreign government hoping to
offer legal facts to the Court in support of an immunity claim must either accept
the Court's jurisdiction by filing a suit, and thus position itself in a vertical rela-
tionship vis-A-vis the judiciary, or it must go through the U.S. executive branch,
therefore using horizontal networks.
Coudert's proposed alternative to Justice Van Devanter's three options-
namely, a private counsel appearing on behalf of the British Embassy as amicus
curiae-was perceived as an unwelcomed novelty. Coudert's approach did not
fall within "the usual official channels" and therefore was a "marked departure
from what theretofore had been recognized as the correct practice."
91 It was es-
tablishing a diagonal network between the Court and the foreign sovereign. Ac-
cording to the Court, traditional methods have a number of advantages: they
make for better international relations, they conform to traditional diplomatic
usages, they grant respect to the U.S. executive branch, and they tend "to pro-
mote harmony of action and uniformity of decision."92
Justice Van Devanter, however, did not address the ways in which his
opinion-if interpreted broadly-would limit foreign governments: indirect
participation through the Attorney General is a cumbersome, slow, and poten-
tially conflicted process. Notably, the Court did not explicitly limit its reason-
ing to fact-based arguments. However, in light of The Strathearn cases and The
Archimedes case discussed below,93 it appears clear that Justice Van Devant-
er's opinion was not meant to apply with equal force to interest-based argu-
ments. When it comes to the latter, the Court has correctly and undeniably rec-
ognized the advantages of diagonal networks for foreign amici.
Ten days after In re Muir was decided, the Court took another chance in
The Pesaro94 to further limit the ability of foreign sovereigns to directly appear
in front of the Court on factual grounds.95 The Court implicitly answered the
question that it had left open over one hundred years earlier in The Anne: may
the official representative of a foreign sovereign appear directly in front of the
Court and make suggestions-or even file an amicus brief-on the issue of
immunity without going through the Secretary of State?
96
89. Id.
90. Id. at 533.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. Jackson v. The Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463, 470 (1928).
94. In The Pesaro, the Italian Ambassador filed a suggestion to the effect that the ship subject
to an in rem proceeding was owned by the Kingdom of Italy and thus immune. See 255 U.S. 216 (1921).
95. Compare In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532 (1921) (decided on Jan. 17, 1921) with Monday,
December 6, 1920, 1920 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 79, 83 (granting the motion to advance to oral argument in The
Pesaro).
96. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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Justice Van Devanter's answer was no. The Court found that the sugges-
tion should have come through "official channels."97 Though a certificate from
the Secretary of State proving the diplomatic status of the Italian Ambassador
accompanied the Ambassador's suggestion, "the Ambassador did not intend
thereby to put himself or the Italian government in the attitude of a suitor, but
only to present a respectful suggestion and invite the court to give effect to
it." 98 That is, because the Italian Ambassador decided not to interact with the
Court in a vertical manner by filing a claim and accepting the Court's jurisdic-
tion, the Ambassador could only act horizontally via the U.S. executive branch.
3. Following In re Muir and The Pesaro: An Assessment of the
Damages
With the two major cases discussed above, both decided by the admiralty
specialist of the Supreme Court at the time, the practice of direct participation
of foreign governments proving sovereign immunity through fact-based allega-
tions ceased. Fact-based arguments lived a short life. Quite possibly, the Court
did not want to become an active player in U.S. foreign affairs. And playing the
role of an arbiter of the good faith and reliability of foreign sovereigns' fact-
based allegations would have required the Court to do so. Texas Co. v. Hogarth
Shipping Co. was another case involving the British Embassy in which Coudert
participated as amicus curiae in the lower courts.99 This case, which had been
granted the same day of The Pesaro's petition for certiorari, a was argued right
after the In re Muir decision, and decided only after both In re Muir and The
Pesaro.'0
Coudert's case was doomed from the beginning. The British Embassy in-
tervened on the side of Hogarth Shipping, a British company sued for breach of
a charter party.102 Coudert attempted to claim that "the vessel was requisitioned
by the British Admiralty for government service and accordingly was not de-
livered to the charterer,"'03 Texas Company. Because "[t]here can be no more
authoritative source of information ... of the administrative action of a foreign
government within its own territory"' than that government's diplomatic rep-
resentative, Hogarth Shipping should not pay damages to Texas Company.05
Justice Van Devanter did not consider any of the arguments made by Coudert
97. The Pesaro, 255 U.S. at 218.
98. Id. at 219.
99. 256 U.S. 619 (1921).
100. Monday, December 6, 1920, 1920 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 83 (granting the motions to advance to
oral argument in The Pesaro and Hogarth).
101. 256U.S.at619.
102. A "charter party" is a contract between the owner of a vessel and a person wishing to char-
ter the vessel either for a set period of time or for a certain voyage. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 40 (2017).
103. Brief of Counsel for British Embassy at 2, Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S.
619 (1921) (No. 555).
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id. at 14-15.
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in his brief. In a few sentences, he held that In re Muir and The Pesaro were
controlling.'
The Court's decisions in The Pesaro and In re Muir represent a landmark
moment in understanding the Court's institutional behavior toward foreign
amici. Neither law nor custom necessitated the Court's holding that a represen-
tation of immunity can only be made through the executive branch. In fact, it
was common for Courts of Appeals of the time to accept ambassadors' claims
in support of public status and sovereign immunity.10
7
Moreover, questioning the reliability of allegations by official representa-
tives of foreign governments would directly defeat the purpose of allowing for
such representations to be made in the first place-namely, comity and amity
between the United States and a foreign government. But, at the same time, the
Court did not want to be the institution responsible for evaluating the credibility
of facts offered by foreign sovereigns: let the executive branch decide, the Jus-
tices must have thought. For this reason, the Justices couched their pushbacks
in The Pesaro and In re Muir on procedural grounds. In doing so, the Court
struck a proper and reasonable balance between completely shutting its doors to
foreign amici and letting all foreign amici participate.
Nonetheless, The Pesaro and In re Muir risked chilling the ability of for-
eign amici to take part in proceedings before the Supreme Court. These cases
made clear that certain foreign amici were actually perceived as inimici by the
Court. And, indeed, Coudert only wrote one additional brief on behalf of the
British Embassy as amicus curiae, again on the Seamen's Act and the Jones
Act. 08 In that case, Jackson v. The Archimedes, the Court ruled favorably for
the British Government, implicitly agreeing with Coudert's reasoning.109
Coudert limited the intervention to considerations of the United Kingdom's in-
terests. He argued that ruling in favor of Petitioner would create "a standing in-
vitation to all foreign seamen to collect half wages ... and then desert their
ships and leave them stripped of their crews . . . . A construction so adverse to
the vital interests of a friendly nation should not be placed upon an American
statute." 110 Though The Archimedes was a win for interest-based arguments,
no further amicus briefs were filed by a foreign government until 1952.
The outcomes and effects of The Pesaro and In re Muir appear especially
puzzling if one considers the extent to which the Court had been willing to en-
106. 256 U.S. at 629 (citing In re Muir, 254 U.S. 552 (1921) and The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216
(1921), holding that neither a private counsel on behalf of a foreign embassy nor a foreign ambassador
may bring factual allegations in front of the Justices without first going through the official channels of
the U.S. executive branch).
107. See, e.g., The Adriatic, 258 F. 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1919) (holding that "[oln principles of
international comity, we feel bound to accept the suggestion and avowal of the British ambassador as
conclusive[]"); The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1919) (holding that "[t]hat the suggestion [of
the ambassador] was sufficient proof of the statements contained in it is not seriously contested. We ac-
cept it as verity").
108. Motion and Brief of Counsel for British Embassy as Amici Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, Jackson v. The Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928) (No. 103).
109. Jackson v. The Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463, 470 (1928) (holding that it was not the inten-
tion of Congress to forbid advance payments on foreign vessels in foreign ports through the Jones Act).
110. Motion and Brief of Counsel for British Embassy as Amicus Curiae, supra note 108, at 16.
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gage with foreign amici. Coudert was granted leave to participate in the oral
argument in four of the five cases discussed above, including In re Muir.11
Therefore, unlike Eichensehr has claimed, participation by foreign amici in the
oral argument was far from "highly unusual,"" 12 at least during the early history
of this practice. The Court was willing not only to read briefs but also to hear
oral arguments from foreign amici, before proceeding to actively engage with
their claims in its written opinions.
Arguably, then, foreign amici's arguments appeared in the Court's opin-
ions because the Justices read them, liked them, and found them useful-and
not because law clerks were enticed by them.13 In those years, indeed, the Jus-
tices did not delegate as many tasks to their law clerks (if they had any).114 The
Justices saw the important role that foreign amici did and should play in litiga-
tions involving foreign interests, and they acted accordingly.
In light of these facts, the only explanation for the Court's pushback is
political in nature. The Court felt comfortable with balancing different sets of
interests, but seemingly not with evaluating the credibility of foreign amici's
conclusory, fact-based allegations. That is not part of the Court's institutional
role as the highest court of appeals. Ultimately, the Court lacks expertise, expe-
rience, and knowledge when it comes to international law and foreign rela-
tions-namely, foreign interests."5 The Justices, for this reason, do and should
defer to the U.S. executive branch16 or to foreign governments when it comes
to foreign interests. However, deference to a foreign government raises con-
cerns regarding legal facts that shape the outcome of a case. Amici facts may
be unsupported. Allison Orr Larsen offers a similar cautionary argument in her
study of amicus briefs titled The Trouble with Amicus Facts."7 The identity of
anici as foreign governments, outside of the Court's jurisdiction, brings to sali-
111. See Monday, April 1, 1918, 1917 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 203-04 (granting Coudert's leave to take
part in the oral argument as amicus curiae in Strathearn 1); Monday, December 16, 1918, 1918 J. SUP.
CT. U.S. 82 (In re Muir); Monday, June 9, 1919, 1918 J. SUP. CT. U.S. 274 (Strathearn II); Monday,
November 22, 1920, 1920 J. Sup. CT. U.S. 76 (Hogarth); Thursday, December 1, 1927, 1927 J. Sup. CT.
U.S. 128-29 (The Archimedes).
112. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 325.
113. Cf Noah Feldman, The Dark Side of All Those 'Friends' at the Supreme Court,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-09/the-dark-side-
of-those-amicus-briefs-at-the-supreme-court (arguing that, since the law clerks and not the Justices read
the amicus briefs, the clerks are therefore largely responsible for amicus brief citation in the Court's
opinions).
114. See Alexandra G. Hess, The Collapse of the House that Ruth Built: The Impact of the
Feeder System on Female Judges and the Federal Judiciary, 1970-2014, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC.
POL'Y & L. 61, 68 (2015) (discussing how the modem conception of a clerkship developed in the 1920s
and how the practice of each Justice having one clerk began only in 1924).
115. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 43, at 662 (discussing the "general respect given by courts to
the executive branch's views based upon its status as an able and knowledgeable representative of Unit-
ed States interests"); Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 329 ("The most frequent justification for deference is
the executive branch's expertise with respect to foreign relations issues as both an absolute matter and
relative to the Court's comparative lack of expertise.").
116. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1230, 1238 (2007) (describing the courts' tendency to defer to the executive branch's determination
of international facts and foreign affairs issues).
117. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REv. 1757
(2014) (arguing that the Court should be careful in its consideration of facts offered by amici, which are
necessarily channeled through the lens of advocacy).
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ence the troubling nature of fact-based interventions, leading the Court to
properly limit foreign amici participation.
Moreover, there might be a direct tie between the pushback against for-
eign amici and the Court's view that the executive branch is "the sole organ"
responsible for international relations. 118 Three of the Justices of the In re Muir
Court also were on the Court that decided Curtiss-Wright.119 And, importantly,
Justice Van Devanter-the author of In re Muir and The Pesaro-was the most
senior member of the Curtiss-Wright Court.
The Court was perhaps simply not ready to play a more active role in for-
eign affairs, directly interfacing with foreign sovereigns. The Justices correctly
signaled that their role should not be judging the good faith and reliability of
foreign governments' fact-based allegations, since the Court has no expertise
on the matter. But, notwithstanding the Court's pushback, fact-based arguments
are rather rare; the Justices thus continued to be generally welcoming of foreign
amici participation in other areas.
B. Acceptance ofInterest-Based Participation: OfForeign Sovereigns
and Foreign Interests
Following Coudert's final brief in The Archimedes on behalf of the Brit-
ish Embassy in 1927, no amicus brief was filed by a foreign sovereign in front
of the Court until Lauritzen v. Larsen, in 1952.120 Given the Court's pushback
against foreign sovereign fact-based briefs, and the escalation of international
tensions leading up to World War II, the hiatus is unsurprising. Lauritzen repre-
sents not only the rebirth of foreign sovereign amicus briefs, but also the begin-
ning of successful coordinated strategies among foreign sovereigns filing as
amici.121 The Danish Government filed an amicus curiae brief at the certiorari
stage,122 and then again on the merits.123 Foreign amici engaged in a carefully
orchestrated strategy: on the same day in which Denmark filed its amicus brief
on the certiorari petition, the United Kingdom also filed.124 Four days later, the
Netherlands and Norway followed. 125
118. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
119. The Court handed down In re Muir in 1921 and Curtiss-Wright in 1936. Justices Willis
Van Devanter (in office from 1910 to 1937), James Clark McReynolds (from 1914 until 1941), and Lou-
is Brandeis (from 1916 until 1939) sat on both Courts.
120. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
121. A Danish seaman, Mr. Larsen, filed a suit in New York under the Jones Act for negligent
injuries, and he won in the courts below. See id.; Larsen v. Lauritzen, 196 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1952).
122. Brief of the Royal Danish Government, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petition, Lau-
ritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (No. 226) (filed on Sept. 30, 1952).
123. Brief of the Royal Danish Government, as Arnicus Curiae, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571 (1953).
124. Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953)
(No. 226) (filed on Sept. 30, 1952).
125. Brief of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Amicus Curiae, in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (No. 226) (filed on Oct. 3,
1952); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Royal Norwegian Government, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571 (1953) (No. 226) (filed on Oct. 3, 1952).
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Here, unlike Coudert's attempts in In re Muir, foreign anici were not of-
fering legal facts and conclusions, but rather arguments and considerations of
the effects of the Court's ruling abroad. In turn, the Court appeared to be com-
fortable with these briefs on foreign interests. Petitioner's arguments were ac-
tually given the same force of, and at times conflated with, those of the Danish
Government's amicus curiae brief.126 Moreover, Justice Jackson espoused and
succinctly summarized the main arguments of the Danish Government's ami-
cus brief.127 In the end, the coordinated strategy of Denmark, Netherlands,
Norway, and the United Kingdom resulted in a 7-1 decision in favor of Lau-
ritzen.
Over the following twenty-five years, there were nine additional instances
in which foreign governments filed amicus curiae briefs on the merits. In total,
sixteen amicus curiae briefs were filed by foreign governments in this peri-
od.128 Without double-counting amicus briefs filed by the same government at
both the certiorari and the merits stages, foreign sovereigns filed as amici in at
least six other certiorari petitions denied by the Court.129 Thus, as outlined in
126. See, e.g., Larsen, 345 U.S. at 575 ("The shipowner, supported here by the Danish Gov-
ernment, asserts that the Danish law supplies the full measure of his obligation. . . .")
127. Justice Jackson reasoned that ruling in favor of Respondent would result in "subject[ing] a
ship to a multitude of systems of law, . . . put[ting] some of the crew in a more advantageous position
than others, and not unlikely in the long run ... diminish[ing] hirings in ports of countries that take best
care of their seamen." Id. at 588. Cf Brief of the Royal Danish Government, as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 123, at 8-9 (arguing that affirming the lower court would subject the ship to a "multiplicity of laws"
and "give rise to discrimination amongst Danish seamen on Danish vessels," in addition to the fact that
"a Danish ship owner will be reluctant to hire seamen while in [ports whose laws are especially favora-
ble to seamen]").
128. See Motion of the Federal Republic of Germany for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae
and Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (No. 76-749); Brief of
the Republic of Liberia as Amicus Curiae, Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215
(1974) (No. 73-748); Brief of the Republic of Liberia as Amicus Curiae, Windward Shipping (London)
Ltd. v. Am. Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (No. 72-1061); Brief of the Royal Greek Government as
Amicus Curiae, Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) (No. 661); Motion of Canada to
File A Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Canada Amicus Curiae, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A.
v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (No. 70); Motion of the Republic of Italy for Leave to File a Brief as Ami-
cus Curiae and Accompanying Brief, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968)
(No. 70); Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (No. 70);
Brief of the Republic of Liberia as Amcius Curiae, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372
U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 33); Brief of the Republic of Panama as Amicus Curiae, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l
Mar. Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 33); Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372
U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 469); Brief of the Government of the Republic of Honduras as Amicus Curiae,
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional De Marineros De Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (Nos. 91, 93, 107);
Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curi-
ae, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional De Marineros De Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (Nos. 91, 93);
Brief of Canada as Amicus Curiae, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional De Marineros De Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963) (Nos. 91, 93, 107); Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Amicus Curiae, Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Nos. 3,
322); Brief of the Government of Denmark, Amicus Curiae, Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Nos. 3, 322); Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Amicus Curiae, Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (No. 252).
129. See Brief of the Republic of Liberia, Port of Houston v. Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) (No. 71-1604) (denying certiorari); Brief of the Republic of Lebanon in
Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Nat'l Comm. of Gibran v. Shiya, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)
(No. 776) (denying certiorari); Brief of the Government of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland as Amicus
Curiae, Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 385 U.S. 921 (1966) (No. 401)
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Appendix A, twenty-two amicus briefs were filed between 1957 and 1978. This
adds up to twenty-five briefs on the merits and six amicus briefs at the certiora-
ri stage between 1918 and 1978.130 During this time, the best amici of the Court
were the United Kingdom (with five briefs), and Canada and Liberia (with four
each). A total of thirteen countries filed amicus briefs. And when amici coordi-
nated their efforts, in four separate instances, their success rate was around six-
ty-six percent.
The cases ranged in topic, but all of those that were granted after 1953
proposed arguments based on foreign interests.132 For example, they argued
that "[t]he continued observance of these [treaty] obligations-and their com-
mon interpretation-are vital to world trade and to the maintenance in interna-
tional relations of the Rule of Law;" 33 that the foreign government's economic
survival depended on the Court's favorable decision;1
34 and that continued rela-
tions between the United States and the foreign sovereign, in addition to multi-
lateral treaties, necessitated a decision favorable to amici.
135 Many briefs ex-
plicitly pointed out the amici's limited intentions, reminding the Court that their
goal was not to weigh in on domestic and procedural legal issues.1
36 That kind
of contribution, in fact, would unlikely be novel and should be perceived as
unwarranted.
(denying certiorari); Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari of J.H. Van Roijen, Am-
bassador Plenipotentiary, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Amicus Curiae, Filed by Consent of the Parties,
Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart, N. v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) (No. 958) (denying certiorari);
Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, on Behalf of the Attorney General of the Prov-
ince of Ontario, Canada, as Amicus Curiae, Rauch v. Stockinger, 361 U.S. 913 (1959) (No. 472) (deny-
ing certiorari); Brief and Appendix for Arnold D. P. Henney, Ambassador of Canada to the United
States, as Amicus Curiae in Opposition, Clay v. Dominion of Canada, 353 U.S. 936 (1957) (amicus brief
of the Canadian Ambassador) (No. 821) (denying certiorari).
130. See infra Appendix A.
131. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (ruling against amici, in a
4-4 split decision); Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (ruling in favor of
amici); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional De Marineros De Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (ruling in fa-
vor of amici); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (ruling against amici); Lau-
ritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (ruling in favor of amici).
132. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (defining fact-based arguments as argu-
ments offering legal facts that, if accepted by the Court, necessitate a specific conclusion; interest-based
arguments, instead, ask the Court to add international economic consequences, treaty regulations, inter-
national customary law, and foreign law to its balancing test); see also supra notes 78-79 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the implications of interest-based and fact-based arguments for the Court's deci-
sion-making process).
133. Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as
Amicus Curiae at 2, Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (No. 252).
134. See Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of the Republic of Libe-
ria as Amicus Curiae at 2, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 33);
Brief for the Government of Denmark, as Amicus Curiae at 1, Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Nos. 3, 322).
135. See Motion of Canada for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Canada,
Amicus Curiae, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (No. 70).
136. See, e.g., Brief for the Government of Denmark as Amicus Curiae, Romero v. Int'l Termi-
nal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (No. 03-322), 1958 WL 91782, at *2 (stating that "[i]t would
not be appropriate for this brief to deal with the procedural problems involved"); Brief for the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae at 2, Panama Ca-
nal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (Nos. 251, 252) (claiming that "[i]t would not be ap-
propriate for this brief to deal with the domestic legal issues, procedural problems and accounting
methods involved").
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The Court made it a habit to grant motions allowing for the participation
of foreign amici even when respondents objected.137 This is proof of the
Court's willingness to consider foreign sovereigns as truly amici, so long as
they inform the Court on foreign interests rather than provide legal facts. The
Court found foreign amici's contribution meaningful to the resolution of cases
involving foreign interests.
With the proliferation of foreign amici and interest-based arguments, it is
not surprising that the Court eventually decided to put an end to the practice of
indirect participation. Suggestions filed by the U.S. Attorney General continued
to occur between 1921 and 1978,1 1 though on an increasingly rare basis since
interest-based foreign amicus briefs became more frequent. Though indirect
participation had been on its dying bed for decades, the Court eventually pulled
the plug in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States.'39 This should not be charac-
terized as a "shift" "instigated" by the Court,140 but rather as a move that natu-
rally flowed from a long line of precedent.
The complicated dynamics of Zenith Radio are carefully detailed by
Eichensehr and only worth briefly summarizing here: the European Commis-
sion and Japan filed diplomatic notes with the Department of State, which then
asked the Solicitor General to make them available to the Court.141 The indirect
participation of the two foreign governments, however, was not aimed at offer-
ing the Court facts, but rather at highlighting foreign interests. There was thus
no reason why arguments aimed to show the "broad and far-reaching implica-
tions which could have serious effects, not only upon trade between Japan and
the United States, but also on world trade"1 42 would need to be vetted by the
U.S. executive branch.
Interesting to add to Eichensehr's characterization of the shift explicitly
signaled in Zenith Radio is an anecdote from the oral argument. Justice
Blackmun voiced his skepticism of the suggestion practice. When pressured,
the Solicitor General's defense was that "the client of the government here is
the Secretary of State and not a foreign prince or potentate."43 But the Solicitor
137. See, e.g., Motion of the Republic of Italy for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and
Accompanying Brief, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (No. 70), 1967
WL 113704, at *1 (stating that "[c]ounsel for the petitioner have consented to the filing of this brief, but
counsel for respondent has refused consent"); Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and
Brief of the Republic of Liberia as Amicus Curiae at 1, Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Mar. Workers Union, 372
U.S. 24 (1963) (No. 33) (stating that "[t]he Republic of Liberia hereby respectfully moves for leave to
file a brief amicus curiae. Petitioner has consented to the filing of such a brief Respondents have not").
138. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 32 (1945) (describing that a "sug-
gestion was then filed by the United States Attorney at the direction of the Attorney General, transmit-
ting a communication from the State Department, stating that it accepted as true the contention that the
Baja California was the property of the Mexican government"); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 581 (1943) ("[T]he Attorney General instructed the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Louisiana to file in the district court the appropriate suggestion of immunity of the vessel from suit.").
139. 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
140. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 299.
141. Id.
142. Robert Dziubla, Zenith Radio Corp v. United States: The Demise of Congressionally Man-
dated Countervailing Duties, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 318, 336 (1979).
143. See Oral Argument at 24:43, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978)
(No. 77-5529), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger6/oral-argument-audio/16725
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General, while representing the interests of the United States, was also making
representations based on foreign interests. The advocacy line was thus danger-
ously blurred. Indirect participation in cases like Zenith Radio, where the Unit-
ed States also appears as amicus curiae, causes understandable confusion. In
that case, it was not clear to the Court whether the Solicitor General was active-
ly endorsing the importance of the foreign interests or simply offering them in a
neutral, almost factual manner.
The Court had two options. The Justices could have taken Zenith Radio as
a chance to further curtail foreign amici's participation, had they felt uncom-
fortable with this practice as a matter of principle. Or, the Court could have in-
structed the Solicitor General to "request foreign governments to communicate
their views to the judicial branch through the more effective method preferred
by that branch [and the one authorized by the Court's rules]-the filing of for-
mal briefs." 1" The Justices chose the second option. As the Department of
State communicated to the embassies in Washington, D.C., "[t]he United States
will consent to such a filing in any case in which it is a party. In the unlikely
event that any other party should decline to consent, the Supreme Court will
almost certainly grant the motion of a foreign government for leave to file a
brief."1 4
5
Unlike Eichensehr, I believe Zenith Radio is the product of the well-
established history of interest-based foreign sovereign amicus briefs. There was
no continued need for indirect participation because the Court had already
crafted a workable approach to foreign amici: fact-based briefs out; foreign-
interests briefs in.
III. FOREIGN AMICUS BRIEFS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM HISTORY
Thus far, this Note's main objective has been to draw conclusions on the
practice of foreign sovereign anicus briefs filed before 1978. By providing the
("Justice Blackmun: . . . [A]t the request of the Department of the State, you distributed a communica-
tion from the Government of Japan on this matter .... What does that mean vis-a-vis this case?
Solicitor General: I do not think it means anything as far as the duty of this Court is concerned here to-
day.
Justice Blackmun: You do not regard that as instruct [sic] to this Court?
Solicitor General: I do not and I certainly circulated it only because it had been forwarded to us from the
Department of State and we circulated it for what it was worth. We don't suggest hat this Court should
be responsive either to any threat or any apprehension of apocalyptic consequences in the field of inter-
national trade. This Court's task, as we see it, is to decide what did the Congress mean by these words,
"bounty or grant," in the Tariff Act of 1930 . . . . [T]his Court has the power, has the absolute power to
construe this as it sees it in its inform [sic] judicial judgment.
Justice Blackmun: In any event, you are here in good faith, doing your best, to uphold the position es-
poused by the Government of Japan anyway?
Solicitor General: Well, if the Court please, I regard my role here as seeking to uphold the construction
that the Congress, that the Secretary of the Treasury, has placed upon the statute committed to him to
administer. And the client of the Government here is the Secretary of the State and not a foreign prince
or potentate.").
144. Letter from Solicitor Gen. Wade H. McCree, Jr. to Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor of
the Dep't of State (May 2, 1978), in 1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 561 (1978).
145. Circular Note from Dep't of State to Chiefs of Mission in Washington (Aug. 17, 1978), in
1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 560 (1978).
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first account of the pre-1978 history of foreign amici, it has argued that the
Court has welcomed foreign sovereign amicus briefs grounded in foreign inter-
ests, but has remained rather skeptical of fact-based arguments. My analysis of
the different approaches that the Justices have taken over the years, based on
the nature of foreign amici's claims, distances itself from Eichensehr's contri-
bution, which focused on the 1978-2013 timeframe.146 This Note aims to eluci-
date when the Justices will likely defer to foreign amici. But the preceding dis-
cussion provides insights about the role that foreign sovereigns should play in
our judicial system, too. The following sections respectively position foreign
amici's role in today's political and judicial climates.
A. American Isolationism and Today's Supreme Court
In the present era of nationalistic and isolationist rhetoric, interest-based
amicus briefs continue to play a central role in Supreme Court litigation. This
past term, in RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Community, Justice Alito delivered
an opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Thomas)
citing multiple foreign sovereign amicus briefs offering interest-based argu-
ments against the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.147 Those
briefs argued that "[e]xpanding the jurisdiction of this generous United States
private claim system could skew enforcement and increase international busi-
ness risks"l 48 and, more specifically, it could "supersede the national policy de-
cision by Canada that civil recovery by Canadian citizens for injuries resulting
from anti-competitive behavior in Canada should be limited to actual damag-
es. What is most astonishing about Nabisco is that those briefs had been
filed over a decade earlier, in cases unrelated to that dispute. 150
146. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 303 n.64 (clarifying that "the analysis in the remainder of the
Article is based on the foreign sovereign amicus briefs on the merits from 1978 through 2013").
147. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2107 & n.9 (2016) (quoting multi-
ple amicus briefs on behalf of: Canada; France; Germany and Belgium; and the United Kingdom, Ire-
land, and the Netherlands).
148. Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the King-
dom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, F. Hoffmnann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
149. Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 14, F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724); see also Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4, Morrison v: Nat'l Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08-119) ("As applied to foreign-cubed securities fraud actions,
international comity principles preclude application of the anti-fraud rules of U.S. securities laws be-
cause the U.S. interest is attenuated and the foreign interest is paramount .. . [since] nations proscribe
securities fraud using incompatible regulatory schemes."); Brief of the Governments of the Federal Re-
public of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) (arguing that such an expansion fails "to con-
sider the well-settled principles of comity and respect for the sovereign choices of foreign nations that
counsel in favor of a limited application of U.S. antitrust laws to extraterritorial effects . . . [as well as]
the negative impact that an expansive application of U.S. antitrust law could have on domestic and in-
ternational cooperation and enforcement, including prompting retaliatory legislation in other countries").
150. See Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morri-
son v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08-119); Brief for the Government of Cana-
da as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (No. 03-724); Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (No. 03-724); Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the
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Nabisco thus stands for two potentially contradicting propositions: the in-
terests of foreign governments matter when it comes to litigation in U.S. courts;
but U.S. courts should limit their jurisdiction as much as possible, in order to
avoid clashing with foreign interests.
The Court's reliance on interest-based arguments offered by foreign ami-
ci, and the goals such deference serves, are in tension with recent moves to-
wards isolationism. President Donald Trump, during his inauguration speech,
purported to be "issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign
capital, and in every hall of power[:] . .. .America first."'5
1 This kind of politi-
cal isolationism on the part of the executive branch is likely going to exacerbate
the increasing "litigation isolationism"-the attempt to find ways to dismiss
transnational awsuits because of their predominantly foreign scope.
152 Pamela
Bookman has identified the stated goals of litigation isolationism as "promoting
separation of powers and international comity (by keeping the courts away
from disputes involving delicate foreign affairs issues), and protecting the in-
terests of defendants (by sparing them the burdens of transnational litigation in
U.S. courts)."l53 The interplay between the Court's careful consideration of
foreign sovereign amicus briefs in cases like Nabisco and its litigation isola-
tionism is only likely to become even more schizophrenic with the Trump Ad-
ministration.
B. Interest-Based Amicus Briefs: Voicing Deceptive Foreign
Moods?
Two sets of objections may be raised against interest-based amicus briefs:
one grounded in the classic critique of citations of foreign law and the other in
concerns over the public's perception of the Court.
The classic objection that the citation of foreign law simply gives voice to
foreign "moods, fads, or fashions" should readily apply to foreign amici.1
54 The
Court's citation of foreign law often traces back to foreign amici: as this Note
shows, foreign and international law comes to the Justices' attention via amicus
briefs. If critics are troubled by the Court's reasoning in Roper or Nabisco, for
example, they should not focus on the fact that the Justices cited foreign law
and foreign practices. Instead, objections-if any sound ones exist-should be
addressed by the practice of foreign sovereign amici.
But if this objection were to hold against foreign amici, it would have ex-
treme consequences for the amicus curiae institution as a whole. Such an objec-
tion would in fact necessitate the conclusion that the Court's citation of any
amicus brief illegitimately gives voice to interests that are extraneous and, in a
sense, detrimental to the litigation. Amicus briefs by third parties external to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
151. Inaugural Address, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 58 (Jan. 20, 2017).
152. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REv. 1081, 1085 (2015).
153. Id.
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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dispute are meant to bring to the Justices' attention relevant interests and con-
siderations that the Court would otherwise miss. There is no doubt that, for the
most part, the success of amicus briefs depends on their ability to provide valu-
able new information to the Court.5 5 Therefore, the Justices cannot be faulted
for taking into account any of the arguments presented to them in the amicus
briefs. That is the proper role of the Court: to read and evaluate all arguments.
The Court, by reading foreign amici, is not empowering foreign governments'
interests at the expenses of domestic ones. Our system entrusts the Court to
strike the right balance between differing and competing interests-whether
foreign or domestic, whether internal or external to the dispute-in deciding
hard cases.
Moreover, the Court's continued reliance on foreign amici and its will-
ingness to consider foreign interests while interpreting the meaning of U.S.
laws could have repercussions on public perceptions of the Court. The role of
foreign sovereign amicus briefs at the Court could gain negative symbolic over-
tones. Although interest-based briefs do not pose the same kinds of concerns as
fact-based arguments, the foreign sovereign amici practice could fuel a rhetoric
of the Court as an institution that is failing to uphold American standards by
giving way to foreign moods.156
But such a myopic position mistakenly assumes that the Court is an un-
critical consumer of amicus briefs. 5 7 Even Justice Breyer, arguably the most
likely Justice to take foreign amici seriously,' 5 8 has voiced a high degree of
caution in dealing with foreign amici. During the oral argument in Nabisco,
Justice Breyer questioned both the U.S. Solicitor General59 and the lawyer for
the European Unionl60 about the perceived inconsistencies between their cur-
155. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 750 (2000).
156. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court ...
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." (internal quotations omitted)); see
also infra note 169 (citing a few examples of bills introduced in Congress following Lawrence and Rop-
er, that were born out of this rhetoric).
157. Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 363 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at * 11, F. Hoff-
mann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 1047902) (referencing the
oral argument in Empagran, where Justice Scalia asked whether the "majority of nations in the world
that don't have effective antitrust enforcement, if indeed they have any antitrust laws," would agree with
the seven nations who had filed amicus briefs protesting the extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust laws); see
also id. at 363 n.352 (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 266 (2004))
(questioning whether the European Commission's opposition to a U.S. law on discovery in aid of for-
eign judicial proceedings is "widely shared in the international community").
158. See generally BREYER, supra note 2 (arguing that considering foreign law and foreign
amicus briefs is useful).
159. Transcript of Oral Argument at *24, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2107 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2016 WL 1090258 ("[N]ot only do they tell us that the 27 nations of
the EU don't agree with you, [the United States,] but in fact, what's very confusing about this is, in the
Alien Tort Statute case, . . . the EU countries, at least three, were in here with briefs ... saying, stay out
of this stuff. ... And you were on the other side .... So what's going on?").
160. Id. at *24-25 ("Is this the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing in Britain
and .. . in Germany? ... Is it that you [the European Union] actually went and talked to the ambassadors
of England, Germany, the Netherlands and asked them why do you want us to take a different position
in this case than ... you took in the other case? . .. I can't work with [just] a few pages .. . unless I
know what ... you, the State Department, and those other countries, and their ambassadors . . . actually
think.").
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rent positions (the European Union in favor of extraterritoriality of U.S. law
and the United States against it) and previous amicus briefs of both parties (ar-
guing the opposite). Though the Solicitor General dodged the question,161 the
lawyer for the European Union reassured the Court that "EU officials have
gone over every single line [of the brief] and compared with the positions taken
by Member States in other cases."1 62 The Court thus seems to be a rather criti-
cal user of foreign amicus briefs.
Reference to foreign amicus briefs, in an era in which judicial independ-
ence is threatened1 63 and isolationism has become the new globalization,
could nonetheless significantly impact the public perception of the Court no
matter how sophisticated of a consumer it actually is. In 2003, in Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court held that "[t]he right the Petitioners seek in this case has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There
has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circum-
scribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent."l
65 In 2005, in
Roper v. Simmons, the Court recognized the "overwhelming weight of interna-
tional opinion against the juvenile death penalty."1 66 It did so after considering
the interest-based arguments offered by amici, who believed "the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law, to be of vital importance both nationally and in the international
community."l67 Foreign interests in Lawrence and Roper were less tangible
than in most cases in which foreign sovereigns might file amicus briefs, and the
litigations had no transnational aspect to them, unlike Empagran and Nabisco.
Yet, the Justices relied on foreign amici's arguments. That reliance sparked ac-
ademic criticism then,168 and it would arguably become a renewed political
169
weapon now.
161. Id. at *26 ("Well, to my knowledge, we didn't have those consultations.").
162. Id.at*31.
163. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump's Attacks on Judi-
ciary 'Demoralizing', N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/
donald-trump-immigration-ban.html (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, President of the National Constitution Cen-
ter, as saying "Judicial independence is a fragile and crucial achievement of American constitutional-
ism ... and it depends on the public seeing the judiciary as something more than politicians in robes").
164. See, e.g., Brina Seidel & Laurence Chandy, Donald Trump and the Future of Globaliza-
tion, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edulblog/up-front/2016/11/18/donald-
trump-and-the-future-of-globalization ("[A] resistance to globalization was arguably the foremost policy
theme in Trump's election campaign.").
165. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
166. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005).
167. Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community
in Support of Respondent at 1, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
168. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & POL'Y
291, 296 (2006) ("Foreign and international law cannot be legitimately used in an outcome-
determinative way to decide questions of constitutional interpretation."); Joan L. Larsen, Importing
Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization ": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use ofForeign
and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1326-27
(2004) (criticizing the Court's use of "foreign and international law to infuse the Constitution with sub-
stantive meaning").
169. See, e.g., S. 520, 109t' Cong. (2005) (proposing that it be made an impeachable offense for
any federal judge to interpret the U.S. Constitution by relying on foreign and international law) (co-
sponsored by nine Republican Senators); H.R. Res. 97, 109' Cong. (2005) ("[Jludicial interpretations
regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on
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This danger would become even more salient if one were to endorse the
notion that the relevance of foreign amici and the deference granted to them by
the Court comes down to differing judicial philosophies. Under that theory, any
Justice referencing a foreign sovereign amicus brief would be an easy target for
political attacks. Professor Harold Koh argues that, based on their approaches
to the relationship between international law and domestic law, the Justices fall
into two distinct factions: the transnationalists (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
at times, Kennedy) and the nationalists (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).1 70 Justice Breyer has been particularly vocal among
the so-called transnationalists, and he has emphatically stressed the relevance
of foreign sovereign amicus briefs for the Court.171 As the title of Justice Brey-
er's book suggests, the current debate over the citation of foreign law arises
from "the new global realities." 72 "At stake is nothing less than America's po-
sition in a globalizing world." 73 Because foreign law often comes to the Court
through foreign sovereign amici, and because there appears to be some truth to
these two camps, reliance on foreign amici could be condemned along lines of
judicial philosophy.
But such an oversimplification would not do justice to the complexity of
the Court's current practice of considering interest-based foreign amicus briefs
and the long history of foreign sovereign amici. As this Note highlights, there is
more to foreign amici than the transnationalists/nationalists divide, and the de-
bate has not always been about globalization. For a long time, irrespective of
judicial philosophy, the Court has signaled that it welcomes and values interest-
based foreign sovereign amicus briefs. Indeed, as Eichensehr notes in pass-
ing,174 judicial philosophies and perceived partisan lines do not speak to the en-
trenched nature of foreign amici. Every single Justice currently on the Court
(except Justice Gorsuch) has written or signed onto at least one opinion citing
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pro-
nouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution of the United States.")
(co-sponsored by eighty-two Republican Representatives and two Democrats).
170. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 745, 749
(2006). The judicial writings of Justice Neil Gorsuch during his tenure on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit provide practically no guidance on his approach to the citation of foreign and intema-
tional law. See ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44778, JUDGE NEIL M. GORSUCH:
HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME COURT 84-85 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44778.pdf However, most likely, Justice Gorsuch will step into the late
Justice Scalia's shoes. See id. During his confirmation hearing, Justice Gorsuch recognized that, in cer-
tain instances, such as while "interpreting a contract with a choice of law provision that may adopt a
foreign law," the citation of foreign law is "not just proper but necessary." Judge Gorsuch: International
Law, C-SPAN (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4662742/judge-gorsuch-intemational-
law. But, he noted that "as a general matter .. . it is improper to look abroad when interpreting the Con-
stitution." Id.
171. BREYER, supra note 2, at 97 ("We rely upon briefs filed by the parties and by other inter-
ested persons, including the Executive Branch, of course, but also foreign governments."); id. at 133 ("It
is . . . helpful to receive briefs from other nations.").
172. Id.
173. Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Su-
preme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 22 (2005).
174. See Eichensehr, supra note 6, at 293 & n.15.
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foreign amici.1 75 In fact, the consideration of foreign sovereign amicus briefs
even predates the modem era when judicial philosophies became a prominent
divisive factor on the Court. The first to engage with foreign quasi-amici was
Justice Story, who was appointed by James Madison.176 In The Strathearn cas-
es, Justice Day, a Theodore Roosevelt appointee, carefully considered the ar-
guments of foreign amici.1 77 And Justice Jackson, appointed to the Court by
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, wrote the opinion in Lauritzen, citing foreign sov-
ereign amicus briefs.178 That is to say, foreign sovereigns gained traction be-
cause Justices with different judicial philosophies and political leanings have
found it worthwhile to engage with foreign sovereign amicus briefs, and they
have done so for centuries.
C. Moving Forward: Interest-Based Briefs as Amici and not
Inimici Curiae
Foreign sovereign amicus briefs can and should continue to play an im-
portant role in Supreme Court litigation. Justices of all judicial philosophies
and political leanings rely on interest-based foreign sovereign amicus briefs be-
cause foreign interests do play some role in the interpretation of domestic law.
As Justice Breyer put it during the oral argument in Nabisco, "what you [the
United States] think and what those countries think is very important in matters
like this."1 79 Justice Scalia confirmed this in Empagran, when he asked "about
the majority of nations in the world that don't have effective antitrust enforce-
ment, if indeed they have any antitrust laws."180 In fact, in the absence of a
clear congressional mandate to the contrary, it would not be in the interest of
the United States to infringe upon the policy and the laws of friendly foreign
nations.181 Interest-based briefs ensure that the Justices and their three dozen
highly-trained law clerks take into account the vital interests of foreign nations,
which often align with those of the United States. And it also provides comfort
to friendly foreign governments in knowing that the laws of the United States
will not be applied with total disregard for foreign interests.
175. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2107 & 2107 n.9 (2016)
(Alito, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, quoting amicus briefs on
behalf of: Canada; France; Germany and Belgium; and the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Nether-
lands); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670-78 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, citing amicus briefs on behalf of the Netherlands
and the European Commission). Justice Gorsuch has not yet taken part in deciding a case in which a
foreign sovereign has filed an amicus brief.
176. See The Anne, 16 U.S. 435 (1818).
177. See Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920); Dillon v. Strathearn Steam-
ship Co., 248 U.S. 182 (1918).
178. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575 (1953).
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at *24, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2107 (No. 15-138), 2016 WL 1090258.
180. Transcript of Oral Argument at * 1l, F. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 1047902.
181. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than
is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.").
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Because of the potential benefits of foreign sovereign amici, the Court
and the executive branch should continue to encourage this practice insofar as it
is limited to interest-based arguments. Ever since Zenith Radio, the executive
branch has welcomed foreign sovereign amicus briefs.182 And, though the U.S.
Government's shift was prompted by judicial invitation, judicial openness to
foreign sovereign amici is a longstanding institutional tradition of the Court. As
previously discussed, interest-based amicus briefs do not raise the same kinds
of concerns as fact-based amicus briefs. Indeed, most importantly, they do not
necessitate specific legal conclusions, but they simply provide additional con-
cerns to be considered during the Court's careful balancing process. The United
States should not scale back on its welcoming approach to foreign sovereign
interest-based amicus briefs.
CONCLUSION
This Note hopes to shed light on the role and impact of foreign amici: it
highlights the types of briefs that have been successful, accounting for foreign
amici's different strategies; it emphasizes the narrow instances in which the
Court has considered foreign sovereigns as inimici, and the reasons why such
pushback has occurred; and it touches on larger debates regarding the Court's
role in foreign affairs and the citation of foreign law. This Note finds that while
the Justices have felt uncomfortable directly evaluating the credibility of for-
eign sovereigns' fact-based claims, they have been much more welcoming
when the arguments made dealt specifically with foreign interests. In the latter
cases, foreign amici have not only been allowed to file briefs, but these briefs
have also been actively considered by the Justices in their opinions and, on oc-
casion, even expanded upon during oral argument by counsels for amici.
The Court has accordingly drawn a clear line between amici and inimici,
between arguments supporting foreign interests and arguments offering legal
facts. This approach is not simply a symptom of recent increasing politiciza-
tion, nor of the influence of law clerks in drafting opinions.183 It is a centuries-
old practice that evolved organically as the Court's docket and the Justices'
view of their proper role has evolved. It would therefore be a mistake to short-
hand this practice as a recent, controversial development. The Court has cor-
rectly cherished and limited the practice of foreign amici, and the Justices
should continue to consider today's foreign amici as friends, not inimici of the
Court.
182. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
183. See Kelly Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Briefs, 20
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Many of the social arrangements we think of as quintessentially domestic. . are
inextricably interwoven with complex processes in other countries and regions of
the globe. Consider: our security system; our political-economic system; the
search to find and retain external markets for our products; our dependence on
the natural resources without which an advanced industrial and science-based
civilization cannot survive; our health system; our conceptions of fundamental
morality . . . . Even "domestic law" courses can no longer be understood
adequately-whether for descriptive or practical professional purposes-without
an understanding of the organization and dynamics of the international system.
-W. Michael Reisman
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